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DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
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CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2019

TAGS: [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#) [START](#)

SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):
(U) FOURTH MEETING OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
WORKING GROUP, SEPTEMBER 30, 2009

REF: A. GENEVA 0813 (SFO-GVA-V-020) (RUSSIAN
FEDERATION-PROPOSED TREATY ANNEX TEXT)
[1](#)B. GENEVA 0850 (SFO-GVA-V-029)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-032.

[1](#)2. (U) Meeting Date: September 30, 2009
Time: 10:00 a.m. - 12:50 p.m.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

[1](#)3. (S) The fourth meeting of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Working Group completed a review of the U.S. side-by-side comparison of the categories of data in, and structures of, the U.S.-proposed MOU and the Russian-proposed Annex Section II (Ref A). The Russian delegation also completed its presentation on the main composition and structure of the Russian-proposed MOU database.

[1](#)4. (S) The sides exchanged opposing views on whether or not to include listings of support equipment, existing types, and space launch facilities in the MOU. While the Russian delegation debated that support equipment listings were no longer needed in the MOU, the U.S. side defended its inclusion to support the inspection regime. The Russian side probed the U.S. rationale for not considering the Peacekeeper

ICBM and Trident I SLBM to be existing types in the new treaty. Lastly, the sides discussed the Russian proposal to merge space launch facilities and test ranges into one category of facility in the MOU.

A FEW LEFT OVER ISSUES FROM BEFORE

15. (S) Quickly summarizing the previous meeting's work, General Orlov invited Mr. Trout to complete his presentation of the U.S. side-by-side comparison of the two approaches to structuring the MOU (Ref B).

16. (S) Trout opened by seeking clarification on whether Russia intended to retain both loading facilities and static displays as categories of data in the MOU. Orlov agreed to retain loading facilities and agreed in principle to removing static displays. Trout asked whether Orlov could agree to list space launch facilities and eliminated facilities in their respective sections of the MOU. Orlov stated that his delegation would think about space launch facilities and questioned the need for the eliminated facility section. Trout explained that a listing of eliminated facilities was needed to support formerly declared facility inspections proposed by the United States. Orlov said Russia would consider it, but did not see any major problem with it.

SUPPORT EQUIPMENT

17. (S) Trout and Orlov agreed with retaining a section containing technical data on ICBMs and SLBMs except for the proposed addition of throw-weight by the U.S side. Orlov urged that it be left out as it was no longer needed in the new treaty.

18. (S) Seeking clarification on Russia's decision to remove fixed structures and support equipment from the MOU, Trout asked Orlov how inspectors would be able to recognize support equipment. Citing the U.S.-proposed ban on support equipment at eliminated facilities, Trout described the dilemma for inspectors of trying to confirm the absence of items that had never been declared or identified in the first place. Orlov agreed to think about the issue before Colonel Ryzhkov firmly reminded the U.S. delegation that only strategic offensive arms (SOA) would have to be removed from a facility in order for it to be considered eliminated. As such there was no need to list additional items.

19. (S) Using training model of missiles (TMOM) as an example of support equipment, Trout asked how inspectors would know the TMOM was not an SOA if the TMOM was never declared in the MOU. Ryzhkov declared that the focus of inspectors at an eliminated facility should be on the absence of SOA and not support equipment. He affirmed that the Russian side did not consider support equipment accountable under the new treaty. Trout explained that the United States envisioned retaining some of the same MOU data and structure from the START Treaty to facilitate verification, and related how TMOMs could be confused for actual ICBMs and SLBMs.

110. (S) Attempting to shift the focus of the discussion, Orlov asked the U.S. delegation what other types of support equipment would be of concern. After reading the definition of support equipment from the U.S.-proposed Definitions Annex, Trout asked if launch-associated support vehicles (LASV), a type of support equipment associated with road-mobile launchers, could remain at an eliminated ICBM base. Orlov said that the LASVs would not be located at such a closed-out facility but could be relocated to an operational base.

111. (S) Asking whether the U.S. side was prepared to accept similar procedures, Colonel Novikov related how the United

States had declared support equipment associated with heavy bombers and had provided an MOU photograph of the equipment, but subsequently refused to allow inspectors to search for such items during the close-out inspections of certain air bases. Trout stated that support equipment, by definition, was not applicable to heavy bombers and reminded the Russian delegation that information on the heavy bomber equipment in question was provided in START simply as transparency.

BACK TO THE MOU ANNEXES

¶12. (S) Trout compared the last three sections of the U.S.- and Russian-proposed MOU, which showed that the Russian side was in agreement with the U.S.-proposed MOU structure, but not necessarily content, for heavy bomber technical data (U.S. MOU Annex G), heavy bomber nuclear armament technical

data (U.S. MOU Annex H) and other data (U.S. MOU Annex I). Russian had not considered the U.S. proposal to reorganize the section on heavy bomber technical data. Both sides agreed to discuss MOU Annex J during a later meeting.

COMBINING SPACE LAUNCH
FACILITIES AND TEST RANGES

¶13. (S) Referring to a proposal provided by the Russian side during the previous meeting of the MOU Working Group, Orlov asked whether the two sides could agree to combine space launch facilities (SLF) and test ranges into a single type of facility. Trout stated that the United States was still evaluating the concept but had some concerns with the implementation of the Russian proposal. Later, Mr. DeNinno requested further clarification citing potential inconsistencies between the Russian proposal and the Russian-proposed treaty text. He reminded the members of the working group that the U.S.-proposed treaty prohibits test launchers from being located at SLFs and imposes different verification measures on SLFs and test ranges. Specifically, test ranges are subject to inspection while SLFs are not.

¶14. (S) Ryzhkov asked whether the United States believed that this merge would increase transparency. Trout replied that it would be difficult to determine that if the United States does not completely understand the details of the Russian proposal. Ryzhkov then asked how the situation at Leninsk would be different from the U.S. SLF at Meck Island. Trout explained that Meck Island was an SLF declared under START, but that under the U.S.-proposal, Trident I was no longer an accountable missile. There would be no prohibition against its location there.

¶15. (S) Referring to patterns of cooperation, DeNinno asked how Russia planned to treat transfers of SOA to Kazakhstan if SOA was not being transferred to a third Party. Since an item being delivered to Leninsk remained under Russian control, Ryzhkov stated that they did not plan on transferring such an item to a third party. He continued by assuring the U.S. delegation that an appropriate notification (analogous to a START Format 144) would be sent reporting the movement of any such item and that the item would remain accountable under the treaty until launched. Such items would only be in Kazakhstan for a short time. Referring to an ICBM or SLBM being relocated to Leninsk, Trout asked where the accountable item would be listed in the MOU. General Poznihir said that the location would be designated in the MOU to the assigned base or storage facility, but provided no further details.

PEACEKEEPER AND TRIDENT I

¶16. (S) In response to Orlov's inquiry as to where the

United States planned on listing the 50 Peacekeeper ICBM silos, Trout declared the silos were non-functional and, under the U.S. proposal, would not be subject to the new treaty. Referring to a U.S.-proposed silo elimination method, Orlov asked whether the United States intended to

fill the 50 silos with gravel before signature of the new treaty. Trout indicated that the United States had made no decision on eliminating these launchers and that acceptance of the simplified elimination procedures could affect whether the silos ended up in the MOU.

¶17. (S) Following a similar inquiry concerning Trident I launchers on the four U.S. modified SSBNs, Trout explained that the Trident I launchers in question would not be included in the MOU data as they were not existing types under the U.S. approach to the new treaty. Orlov asked twice how the Russians would be able to confirm this, to which Trout replied that is a matter for the Inspection Protocol Working Group.

¶18. (S) After a quick break, Mr. Buttrick clarified the U.S. position regarding Peacekeeper and Trident I by reminding the Russian delegation that only the existing types of strategic offensive arms listed in paragraph 9 of Article III to the U.S.-proposed treaty would be considered accountable. He emphasized that neither Peacekeeper nor Trident I would be listed as existing types. He continued by declaring that the Peacekeeper ICBM was no longer deployed and that the silos did not contain ICBMs or warheads. Similarly, he stated that the tubes on the four modified SSBNs did not contain SLBMs or warheads and could no longer be used as SLBM launchers. He referred any additional questions about existing types to the Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group (TTDWG).

¶19. (S) Orlov stressed that the launchers remained in existence and should remain declared as non-deployed items in these cases. Mr. Luchaninov asserted that it was the job of the MOU Working Group to provide an initial listing of MOU data to the TTDWG. Nevertheless, Trout cautioned the Russian delegation to not get ahead of the TTDWG since that group had not yet discussed what the existing types would be.

¶20. (S) Orlov also asked whether the United States intended to provide data on B-1s that had been converted to non-nuclear heavy bombers and those B-1s that remained unconverted. Trout assured him that data would be provided in both cases but reminded Orlov that the U.S. proposal considered any nuclear-capable heavy bomber converted to non-nuclear status as eliminated from accountability.

WE ARE CLOSER THAN YOU THINK

¶21. (S) Orlov quickly completed his review of the Russian summary of items to be included in the MOU emphasizing two points. He sought agreement on the proposed listing of types of bases and the type of data to be exchanged for such bases. Noting that most of the information corresponded to the U.S. approach, Trout stated that the United States saw no need to list silo launch control centers or other launch control centers as proposed by the Russians.

¶22. (S) Orlov opined that the sides' approaches to structuring the MOU were actually very similar and proposed looking beyond the differences in the titles of sections. Trout and Orlov agreed to have separate sections for ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers similar to the START structure.

Additionally, Orlov proposed placing aggregate numbers up front in these sections followed by the lists of bases and other facilities. He then agreed to consider the U.S. approach for including space launch facilities and eliminated facilities.

¶23. (S) The two sides agreed to each prepare joint draft texts of the MOU before the next negotiation session.

¶24. (U) Documents exchanged:

U.S.

- U.S.-Proposed Inspection Protocol Annexes 1-14, dated September 15, 2009; and

- U.S.-Proposed Elimination Protocol, dated September 24, 2009.

¶25. (U) Participants:

U.S.:

Mr. Trout
LtCol Blevins
Ms. Bosco
Mr. Buttrick
Mr. Colby
Mr. DeNinno
LT Lobner
Ms. Purcell
Mr. Rust
Ms. Gesse (Int)

RUSSIA

Gen Orlov
Amb Antonov
Mr. Kostyuchenko
Mr. Leontiev
Mr. Luchaninov
Col Novikov
Mr. Pishchulov
Gen Poznikhir
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Shevchenko
Gen Venevtsev
Mr. Vorontsov
Col Zaytsev
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)

¶26. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
RICHTER